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INTRODUCTION
The struggle for educational fairness and opportunity for Latino
and Latina children continues even amidst the anti-immigrant
1
campaigns currently raging against noncitizens in the United States.
2
Census 2000 highlighted the reality of the increased number of
noncitizens in the country, particularly Latinos, and has precipitated
∗
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1
The term “noncitizen” is used in this Article instead of the term “alien,” which
is the Immigration and Naturalization Act term used to denote those who are not
United States citizens.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (2004).
Immigration law
commentators have noted that the term alien is a pejorative term that has
connotations of otherness or lack of humanity. See Kevin Johnson, “Aliens” and the
U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 268 (1997); Victor Romero, On Elián and Aliens: A Political
Solution to the Plenary Power Problem, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 343, 343 (20002001); see also Gerald Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187,
and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1441 (1995); Peter
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984). For a
discussion of the anti-immigrant sentiment in the country see IMMIGRANTS OUT!: THE
NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES (Juan F. Perea
ed., 1997).
2
See Michael E. Fix & Jeffrey S. Passel, U.S. Immigration at the Beginning of the 21st
Century,
available
at
The
Urban
Institute,
http://www.urban.org/Template.cfm?Section=Home&NavMenuID=75&template=/
TaggedContent/ViewPublication.cfm&PublicationID=7321(Aug. 2, 2001) (stating in
testimony before the House Judiciary Committee that Census 2000 numbers show
increased immigration levels).
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a renewal of nationwide concern over an “immigration crisis.” This
perceived crisis has given rise to myriad new restrictions on the
participation of noncitizens in United States society.
In recent years, both the states and the federal government have
placed restrictions upon the civic participation of noncitizens in
virtually all areas of the United States’ societal landscape. These new
restrictions on noncitizens, which have sparked a new civil rights
4
movement—a so-called Immigrant’s Rights Movement —touch areas
5
6
as varied as driver’s licensing, workplace protections, access to
7
8
9
health care, welfare benefits, and education, among others.
From the dismantling of bilingual education through voter
10
11
12
initiatives in California, Arizona, and Massachusetts, to the
3

See Linda Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047 (1994) (describing emergent concern in the United States over a
perceived immigration crisis).
4
The Immigrant Workers Freedom Ride, which took place in October 2003, is
an example of the linkage of the Civil Rights movement to the Immigrant Rights
movement. See Steven Greenhouse, Immigrants Rally in City, Seeking Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2003 at A1 (discussing Immigrant Workers Freedom Ride campaign, in which
eighteen buses carrying nine hundred immigrants from ten cities traveled over two
weeks across the United States to Washington, D.C. and New York in an effort to
raise consciousness for the rights of immigrants); AFL-CIO, The Struggle for Immigrant
Workers’
Rights
Is
a
Fight
for
Civil
Rights,
at
http://www.aflcio.org/issuespolitics/immigration/civil_rights.cfm (last visited Apr.
18, 2005).
5
See María Pabón López, More Than a License to Drive: State Restrictions on the Use
of Driver’s Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 89 (2004) (discussing efforts to
restrict state driver’s license issuance to noncitizens).
6
See Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149 (2002) (holding
that undocumented worker not entitled to backpay, although employer engaged in
unfair labor practice).
7
See Undocumented Alien Emergency Medical Assistance Amendments of 2004,
H.R. 3722, 108th Cong. (2004). This bill, introduced by California Congressman
Dana Rohrbacher on January 21, 2004, would have mandated that hospitals verify
their patients’ citizenship status and turn over those who were undocumented to the
Department of Homeland Security. The bill was later defeated. See National
Immigration Law Center, Bill Requiring Hospitals to Report Undocumented Persons
Defeated,
18
IMMIGRANTS’
RIGHTS
UPDATE,
No.
4
(June
18,
2004),
at
http://www.nilc.org/immspbs/health/health028.htm.
8
See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
tit. IV, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601–46 (2005))
(“Restricting Welfare and Public Benefits for Aliens”).
9
See infra Part IV.
10
Bilingual education was dismantled in California in 1998, following the passage
of Proposition 227. See Kevin Johnson & George Martinez, Discrimination by Proxy:
The Case of Proposition 227 and the Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1227, 1227 (2000). The proposition passed “by a sixty-one to thirty-nine percent
margin.” Id.
11
Arizona voters approved Proposition 203 in 2000. See Elizabeth Becker et al.,
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attempted denial of education to undocumented children
13
perpetrated in the 1990s in California’s Proposition 187, Latino
children are suffering disproportionately in the culture war in our
midst. It is my contention that these children, and in particular the
undocumented ones, are caught in the middle of this war against
14
noncitizens. Undocumented children who, as the Supreme Court
recognized, are blameless and present in this country through no
15
fault of their own, have been unwillingly thrust into this unwelcome
role.
This recent phenomenon in our polity has developed despite
16
the Supreme Court’s Plyler v. Doe decision. Simply put, the Plyler
Court held that undocumented children are entitled to a state17
Yet Latino
funded primary and secondary education.
undocumented students remain hostages in the “immigration crisis”
siege, notwithstanding Plyler’s guarantee of a free public education
and the promise of educational equality rooted in two earlier
18
Mexican-American school desegregation cases.
The 2000 Elections: State by State; West, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at B17 (noting that
Proposition 203 passed in Arizona, a state where one in every eight students is not a
native speaker of English); see also William Ryan, Note, The Unz Initiatives and the
Abolition of Bilingual Education, 43 B.C. L. REV. 487, 487 (2002). Proposition 203 is
codified in title 15, sections 751–755 of the Arizona Revised Statutes.
12
Question 2 passed in Massachusetts by a 68% to 32% margin in 2002. See
Charu A. Chandrasekhar, The Bay State Buries Bilingualism: Advocacy Lessons from
Bilingual Education’s Recent Defeat in Massachusetts, 24 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 43, 43
(2003).
13
See infra Part IV.B.
14
Indeed, language-minority students, most often noncitizens and many of them
undocumented, have also fared poorly in the national immigration battles. For
example, the fact that in the midst of all the celebrations of the fiftieth anniversary of
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), no academic or media attention has
been devoted to the fact that it is also the thirtieth anniversary of Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563 (1974), the Supreme Court opinion that ushered in the era of bilingual
education, is very telling in this regard.
15
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
16
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
17
Id. at 230.
18
The earliest recorded case in the struggle for equality in education for Latino
students is Alvarez v. Owen, No. 66625 (Cal. Sup. Ct. San Diego County filed Apr. 17,
1931), commonly known as the “Lemon Grove Incident.” See Robert R. Alvarez, Jr.,
The Lemon Grove Incident: The Nation’s First Successful Desegregation Court Case, 32 J. SAN
DIEGO
HIST.
116
(Spring
1986),
available
at
http://sandiegohistory.org/journal/86spring/lemongrove.htm (last visited Apr. 18,
2005). The case took place in the 1930s in the community of Lemon Grove in San
Diego County, California and was the nation’s first successful school desegregation
case. Id. The community’s attempt to bar Mexican students from grammar school
was unsuccessful, once a lower court ordered the admission of all Mexican students
to the school and indicted school board members for illegal segregation. Id. The
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These vulnerable students generally still face severe challenges
to their educational prospects. Thus, more than twenty years after
Plyler, it is necessary to understand what has happened to the
education of Latino undocumented children in the United States.
What can we learn from Plyler and its aftermath? What is the future
of Plyler v. Doe? Why is it that Plyler’s promise of educational equality
has not reached its full potential? And finally, what meaning does
Plyler have in the current discussion of membership and exclusion in
our society? These are largely unanswered questions that no article
can completely address. In an attempt to shed some light on these
murky questions, however, this Article explores the various aspects of
the United States educational system and how the Latino
undocumented student has fared post-Plyler.
Part I of this Article examines the current situation of Latino
undocumented students in an effort to understand the challenges
facing both the students and the educational systems in which they
are immersed. Using census and other available data, Part I discusses
the number of undocumented students currently in American
schools and sets forth a picture of their educational status and
attainment. Also, this section provides a review of the challenges and
obstacles standing in the way of educational achievement for Latino
undocumented students, painting a portrait of their daily realities.
In order to provide an understanding of the nuances of Plyler v.
Doe, Part II closely examines the opinion and Part III explores its
subsequent history. Next, Part IV reviews the circumstances in which
Plyler has come under attack and assesses the continued vitality of
Plyler. Finally, Part V offers an analysis of the two recent major
affirmative action cases. The aim of Part V is to examine the Court’s
most recent pronouncements regarding equal protection as it
pertains to education and those cases’ effects on the vitality of Plyler.
In particular, Part V discusses access to higher education for the
undocumented, using research of pending federal legislation and
also by reviewing all fifty states’ laws regarding higher education for
undocumented students.
This Article will show that Plyler stands for the proposition that
19
education, although not a fundamental right, is an integral aspect of
membership in our community. Thus, Plyler is still a vital opinion
second Mexican-American desegregation case is Westminster School District v. Mendez,
161 F.2d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 1947), in which the court found that the segregation of
school children of Mexican descent was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In this sense, Westminster may be viewed as a precursor to the landmark decision of
Brown v. Board of Education.
19
See infra notes 87–95 and accompanying text.
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even in the face of the current “immigration crisis” because Plyler
stands for abolition of castes and an affirmation of equality—two
precepts which should still be bedrock principles of the critical
democratic moment in which we live.
This Article argues, however, that these two propositions for
which Plyler stands are dead letters in the face of the reality of the
undocumented student. The unwelcome but inescapable reality for
undocumented students is that, without the prospect of normalizing
their immigration status, the education they receive is useful
individually for personal growth, but is of no consequence for the
betterment of the overall condition of Latinos in the United States
because the undocumented remain unable to participate in our
democratic society. In that sense, Plyler v. Doe may join Brown v. Board
20
of Education as a decision embodying the interest convergence
covenants in which educational opportunities for minority students
exist only when the students’ interests and the nation’s interests
21
converge.
Analyzing Plyler under an interest convergence model
demonstrates that the nation’s interest is the maintenance of an
underclass of undocumented, low-wage earners who fuel the nation’s
economy by performing work that is undesirable to many United
States natives. The continued existence of this underclass must be
related to the limited educational attainment of those in the group, a
result perpetuated by the lackluster effect of Plyler as a catalyst for
22
further educational gains for Latino undocumented children.
I.

THE STATUS OF LATINO AND UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS IN THE
UNITED STATES

A. `General Data Regarding Latino and Immigrant Students
According to the latest census data, 10.5 million students in the
United States are children of immigrants, and one-fourth of these
23
students are foreign born. More than one-third of the children of
20

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 67 (2004).
22
Admittedly, this view may change over time with a greater acceptance by the
United States populace of the undocumented worker. As the number of retiring
Americans increases, and there is a realization that the Social Security benefits
available for them would be larger, or they could retire earlier with new entrants into
the Social Security system who bring the fruits of their labor into the system,
acceptance of undocumented workers may grow.
23
Michael E. Fix & Jeffrey S. Passel, U.S. Immigration: Trends & Implications for
Schools 4, available at Educational Resources Information Center, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
http://www.eric.ed.gov/, document no. ED474609 (Urban Inst. Jan. 29, 2003).
21
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24

immigrants hail from Mexico while one-fifth come from other Latin
25
American countries.
The census data also show that there are over 11.4 million
26
Latino children under the age of eighteen in the United States.
This number represents 16% of all the children in the United States,
27
even though only 12% of the overall population is Latino. This
population increased by approximately ten million between 1990 and
2000, accounting for 38% of the United States’ population growth
28
during that decade. Finally, the Census Bureau estimates that by the
year 2050, Latinos in the United States will number ninety-eight
million—more than three times their current number—representing
29
about 25% of the total population.
B. Data on Undocumented Students in the United States
Because of the nature of the lives of undocumented persons as
being in the “shadows” of the United States population, there is no
actual data regarding the number of undocumented persons in the
country; only estimates are available. It is also difficult to estimate the
30
number of undocumented schoolchildren in the United States.
Undocumented parents are reluctant to come forward and identify
themselves to census takers or benefit providers for fear of being
reported to the authorities. The latest estimates show that two out of
every ten undocumented persons in the country are undocumented
31
students.
The federal government has recently addressed this
concern. “The Census Bureau is developing a research plan aimed at
24

The term “immigrant” is not used with its strict immigration law meaning for
purposes of the data compilation cited above. It instead includes the following
immigration law categories: immigrants, non-immigrants, refugees, legal permanent
residents and even certain naturalized citizens. Id. at 11.
25
Id. at 7.
26
Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Status and Trends in the
Education
of
Hispanics,
available
at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2003008 (Apr. 15, 2003)
[hereinafter Status and Trends].
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
ILLEGAL ALIEN
SCHOOLCHILDREN—ISSUES IN ESTIMATING STATE-BY-STATE COSTS, available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04733.pdf (June 2004) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
31
Jeffrey S. Passel et al., Undocumented Immigrants: Facts and Figures, available at
Urban Institute, http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=1000587 (Jan. 12, 2004) (noting
that undocumented students comprise 1.6 million of the approximately 9.3 million
undocumented persons in the United States).

2005

BEYOND PLYLER V. DOE

1379

eventually developing new information on the population of illegal
32
immigrants residing in the United States.” Thus, the information
needed to more accurately determine the number of undocumented
students in the country should be available in the near future.
C. Data Regarding the Educational Attainment of Latino Students
Recent data suggest that much of the increase in minority
enrollment in elementary and secondary schools is attributable to
Latinos. Yet, they have higher drop-out rates and lower high school
33
completion rates than African American or White-Anglo students.
In 2000, 39% of public school students at the K–12 levels were
34
35
minorities. Of these, slightly less than half, or 44%, were Latino.
In terms of change over time, the overall percentage of minority
36
students in public schools increased by 17% between 1972 and 2000.
Slightly more than 10% of the increase was attributable to Latinos,
while the number of African American students increased by only
37
2%. The drop-out rate for Latino students is 28% as compared with
7% for White-Anglo students and 13% for African American
38
students.
Even though there is a positive relationship between education
and salary for all racial/ethnic groups in this country, data from a
recent study suggest that incomes of Latino men are lower than those
39
of Anglo men at most educational levels. Finally, aggregate national
statistics document lower achievement levels for Latino immigrant
40
students in several areas, including standardized testing.

32

GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 18.
Status and Trends, supra note 26.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. Specifically, in 2000, the median earnings of Hispanic men age twenty-five
and older were $13,000 less than that of white men, while the median earnings of
Hispanic women age twenty-five and older were $6500 less than that of white women.
Id.
40
Bd. on Children & Families et al., Immigrant Children and Their Families: Issues
for Research and Policy, 5 CRITICAL ISSUES FOR CHILDREN & YOUTHS 72 (1995), available
at
http://www.futureofchildren.org/information2826/information_show.htm?doc_id=
71141 [hereinafter Immigrant Children].
33
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D. Data on Limited English Proficiency (“LEP”) Students in the
United States
Although the following figures are not restricted to
undocumented or Latino children, they are worth reviewing because
it is apparent that the current influx of new immigrant groups means
continuing increases in the number of students who enter United
41
States schools with little or no English proficiency. Between 1990
and 2000, the overall LEP student population in the United States
42
increased by more than half, from 14 million to 21.3 million.
Between 1980 and 2000, the number of children in the United
States speaking a language other than English at home more than
43
doubled, from 5.1 million to 10.6 million. The most recent census
data show that two-thirds of all non-English-speaking families speak
44
Spanish. The data further show that 2.6 million students are LEP,
45
representing 5% of all students in United States schools. About 1.7
46
million of these are United States natives. The Census Bureau also
estimates that 1.8 million school-age children live in households in
47
which no one age fourteen or older speaks English “very well.”
Studies have shown that noncitizen students are at serious risk
for failure in the absence of bilingual education, as they are
48
disproportionately represented among LEP students. The data have
also shown that it is often the case that LEP affects school
49
achievement.
E. Other Challenges Facing Undocumented and Latino Students
1.

Fear of Deportation

Undocumented children also face challenges in terms of their
mental and emotional health because of the added stress associated
50
with the fear of deportation and separation from family members.
This fear of deportation, in particular, can extend all the way to the
school gate. For example, in Virginia, “[p]ublic employees in higher
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

Status and Trends, supra note 26.
Fix & Passel, supra note 23, at 11.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Immigrant Children, supra note 40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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education are encouraged to voluntarily disclose to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service and to the Office of the Attorney General
in Virginia factual information indicating that a student on campus is
unlawfully present in the United States, or enrolled without proper
51
authorization.”
Fear of deportation also has its source in the fact that the
federal government has invited local law enforcement agencies to
enforce immigration laws, and the invitation has been accepted in
52
some states and localities.
For example, in Florida, state law
enforcement entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with the
federal government in 2002 whereby state law enforcement agents
were trained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
then worked under federal supervision and were able to enforce
53
federal immigration law. Thus, deportation for the undocumented
student may only be as far away as a call to the local police for any
infraction of state law.
2.

Migrant Students’ Concerns

In addition, there is another segment of the Latino
undocumented student population—the children of migrants—that
faces severe challenges. Migrant students travel seasonally with their
parents and families, following the various crop harvests that provide
them seasonal employment from state to state. These students
experience daunting obstacles on a routine basis. Their parents
51
Memorandum from Alison P. Landry, Assistant Attorney General, to
Presidents, Chancellor, Rectors, Registrars, Admissions Directors, Domicile Officers
and Foreign Student Advisors (INS Designated School Officials) and the Executive
Director of the State Council for Higher Education in Virginia (Sept. 5, 2002),
available at http://www.steinreport.com/va_colleges_11152002.htm.
52
The invitation of local sheriffs, highway patrols, and police agencies to enforce
immigration law raises Tenth Amendment federalism issues under New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). At least one immigration scholar has concluded that the
form in which the federal government has obtained the cooperation of local law
enforcement, through an invitation, rather than a mandate, avoids Tenth
Amendment concerns. See Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority
Position: Why Inviting Local Law Enforcement to Enforce Immigration Law Violates the
Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 975–76 (2004).
53
Id. at 970–71 (citing Memorandum of Understanding Between the INS and the
State of Florida (July 26, 2002), reprinted in 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1138, app. II, at
1120 (2002)). For a recent example of another locality entering into an agreement
with the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau of the Department of
Homeland Security, see Press Release No. SHB-17A-05, Los Angeles Sheriff’s Office,
Homeland Security Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson Announces Memorandum of
Understanding with Los Angeles County:
MOU Provides for Immigration
Enforcement Training for LA Sheriff’s Department’s Custody Employees (Feb. 24,
2005) (copy on file with author).
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enroll them in school, then withdraw them as soon as they have to
leave in their quest for work. The students are enrolled again in their
54
new schools once they arrive at their next destination. For example,
the academic transcript of a migrant student shows “grading periods
for the same 7 high schools, for the same 4 weeks over each of 4
55
years.”
In addition to the constant geographic displacement and the
educational disadvantages that may ensue from this lifestyle, migrant
students, who number nearly 800,000 in the United States, face other
obstacles in their daily lives, including severe poverty, inadequate
56
housing, and “the stigma of being a migrant.” These are severe
obstacles to educational achievement, regardless of immigration
status.
3.

Resegregation and Inadequate Financing

Due to housing segregation patterns, the United States is
57
currently undergoing educational resegregation.
Supreme Court
decisions limiting school desegregation and authorizing a return to
neighborhood schools have been seen as precursors to resegregation
58
in the United States. In particular, Latinos are disproportionately
affected because of the rise of predominantly Latino neighborhood
59
schools after busing was discontinued. In fact, data cited by the
54

See Cinthia Salinas & Maria E. Franquiz, Making Migrant Children and Migrant
Education Visible, in SCHOLARS IN THE FIELD: THE CHALLENGES OF MIGRANT EDUCATION
xi (Cinthia Salinas & Maria E. Franquiz eds., 2003).
55
Michael A. Olivas, Storytelling Out of School: Undocumented College Residency, Race,
and Reaction, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019, 1081 (1995).
56
Id.; cf. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (remarking on the stigma of
illiteracy, which the Supreme Court stated would mark the undocumented students
for their lifetimes).
57
The 2000 Census data showed increasing residential segregation for Latinos in
almost all parts of the country. This, along with migration, explains much of the
increased segregation in schools. See Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50:
King’s
Dream
or
Plessy’s
Nightmare,
at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg04/resegregation04.php
(Jan. 2004); see also Erica Frankenberg et al., A Multiracial Society with Segregated
Schools:
Are
We
Losing
the
Dream,
at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/resegregation03.php
(Jan. 2003) (describing patterns of resegregation in the United States in the last
twelve years).
58
Id.; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S.
467 (1992); Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). See
generally Joseph R. McKinney, Commentary, The Courts and White Flight: Is Segregation
or Desegregation the Culprit?, 110 EDUC. L. REP. 915 (1996).
59
See, e.g., Keyes v. Cong. of Hispanic Educators, 902 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Colo.
1995). In Colorado, for example, in 1991, only 1% of Latino students were in
intensely segregated minority schools (more than 90% minority enrollment), while
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Supreme Court for the year 2000–2001 show that 76.3% of Latino
children attend schools where “minorities made up a majority of the
60
student body.”
Increased segregation of Latino students is most
apparent in the western part of the country, where 80% of Latino
students attend predominately minority schools—schools with 50–
61
100% minority enrollment. Between 1968 and 2001, the percentage
of Latino students in intensely segregated schools—schools with 90–
62
100% minority enrollment—more than tripled from 12% to 37%.
Thus, Latino undocumented students who live in urban areas are
likely experiencing the resegregation of United States public schools
63
and the concomitant ill effects of this phenomenon, including high
drop-out rates, less-qualified teachers, and fewer educational
64
opportunities.
Another challenge for the Latino undocumented student is one
that faces many urban minority students in the United States. As a
65
result of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, school districts are not required to
have equal financing throughout a state. In fact, after Rodriguez,
school-finance equity concerns must be challenged via state
constitutional provisions. If a state constitution does not specifically
address educational equity in school financing, those challenging
unequal school financing will probably be left without any recourse.
Furthermore, because school districts are mostly funded by
property taxes, poorer areas with lower property values and lower
property taxes result in school districts with inadequate finances,
limiting their ability to fulfill their educational mission. In Rodriguez,
the Supreme Court countenanced a school-financing scheme that
relied on property taxes in the face of an equal protection challenge.
66
Applying the rational basis standard of review, the Court held that
such a system did provide for a basic school education, bearing a
67
rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.
In line with
in 2001, 17% of Latino students were in intensely segregated minority schools. See
Orfield and Lee, supra note 57, at 28.
60
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 345 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing
Frankenberg et al., supra note 57, at 28 fig. 4).
61
Frankenberg et al. supra note 57, at 80 table 37; Orfield & Lee, supra note 57,
at 20 & 21 table 9.
62
Id. at 20.
63
GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION 65–67 (1996).
64
Id.
65
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
66
The use of this standard was in part adopted based on the holding that
education is not a fundamental right. See id. at 29–30, 37–38, 40, 44.
67
Id. at 54–55. This result is precisely the opposite of what had been found by
the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d. 1241 (Cal. 1971), a
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Rodriguez, minority students disproportionately reside in poorer
school districts where they generally perform below average on
standardized tests and where, in fact, schools are most expensive to
68
operate.
The presence of Latinos among the minorities in this
69
group is clearly apt to include undocumented students.
4.

Higher Risk Factors for Latino Students in Higher
Education

A recently published longitudinal study of 15,000 eighth-grade
students in the United States shows that, on average, Latinos are
overrepresented with respect to higher education risk factors. Such
figures show how unprepared these students are for postsecondary
70
education.
In particular, the study found Latinos are
overrepresented in the following risk areas: having parents without a
high school degree (“educational legacy”); having a low family
income; having siblings who have dropped out of school; being held
back in school; having a C or lower grade point average; changing
71
schools; and having children while still in high school. The report
concludes that:
At almost every level . . . Latino youth face an upward struggle.
The impact of these forces is to suppress the educational
opportunity for these youth and lead them to a future that
requires more effort to keep on current standing with other
students, much less than trying to climb up the ladder of
72
opportunity.

decision in which the California school funding system was found in violation of the
state and federal equal protection clauses.
68
See James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV.
432, 435 (1999).
69
Id.
70
Watson Scott Swail et al., Latino Youth and the Pathway to College vii, available at
http://www.educationalpolicy.org (June 2004). The higher risk factors faced by
Latinos in higher education were brought to the attention of the Supreme Court in
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 234 (2003). See Brief of Latino Organizations as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 234 (U.S. 2003) (No.
02-516), available at 2003 WL 536740.
71
Swail, supra note 70, at 28.
72
Id. at 32.
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II. PLYLER V. DOE: A CLOSER LOOK AT A LANDMARK DECISION
A. Applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to the Undocumented
and the Standard of Review Applied: Highlights of the Majority
Opinion
73

Plyler v. Doe is the leading case regarding the education of
Latino undocumented students in the United States. It stands among
a pantheon of landmark educational cases, such as Brown v. Board of
74
75
Education and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. Yet it is
far from just a historical opinion. Indeed, Plyler is a vital opinion
because of the nation’s economic interest regarding the availability of
76
the noncitizen work force. A closer examination of the case will
afford an opportunity to examine the message the Court sent
regarding membership and equality, one that should resonate even
to this day.
Plyler is a groundbreaking case in that, for the first time, the
Supreme Court clearly stated that undocumented persons are
protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
77
Amendment.
Earlier cases had established that undocumented
noncitizens are persons entitled to protection under the Due Process
78
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Plyler Court arrived at this conclusion by stating that
“whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a
79
‘person’ in any ordinary sense of that term.” The Court did so,
building upon established precedent that aliens are “guaranteed due
73

457 U.S. 202 (1982).
347 U.S 483 (1954); see also Kevin Johnson, Civil Rights and Immigration:
Challenges for the Latino Community in the Twentieth Century, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 42, 44
(discussing Plyler as a high-water mark for Latinos before the Supreme Court and
comparing it to Brown).
75
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
76
See, e.g., Halle Butler, Note, Educated in the Classroom or on the Streets: The Fate of
Illegal Immigrant Children in the United States, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1473, 1490–91 (1997)
(discussing data regarding the contributions of noncitizens to the United States
economy). Even President Bush has recognized “a basic fact of life and economics:
some of the jobs being generated in America’s growing economy are jobs American
citizens are not filling.” Press Release, President Bush Proposes New Temporary
Worker
Program
(Jan.
7,
2004),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-3.html.
77
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 213; see also Michael A. Olivas, IIRIRA, The DREAM Act, and
Undocumented College Student Residency, 30 J.C. & U.L. 435, 443 (2004) (discussing how
“[p]rior to Plyler, the Supreme Court had never taken up the question of whether
undocumented aliens could seek Fourteenth Amendment equal protections”).
78
See Olivas, supra note 77, at 443.
79
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210.
74
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process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”
This
81
principle had been established in 1886 in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, where
the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal
protection of the laws was “universal in [its] application, to all
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
82
differences of race, of color, or of nationality.” In Plyler, the Court
reaffirmed Yick Wo and extended the reach of the Fourteenth
83
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to the undocumented. The
Court took this step because, under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
“persons” within the state’s jurisdiction that are to be protected from
the denial of equal protection. Thus, the Amendment’s protections
would apply to those within a state’s borders, even if they are
84
unlawfully present.
A notable aspect of the opinion with regard to the applicability
of the Equal Protection Clause to the undocumented is the Court’s
inquiry into the congressional debate surrounding the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In particular, the Court cited the following
language from the debate recorded in the early legislative history of
the Amendment: “‘Is it not essential to the unity of the Government
and the unity of the people that all persons, whether citizens or strangers,
within this land, shall have equal protection in every State in this
85
Union in the rights of life and liberty and property?’” In other
words, the Court used the early legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment to buttress its ruling that the Equal Protection Clause
applied to the undocumented plaintiffs in the case.
Once the Court had determined the applicability of the Equal
Protection Clause to the undocumented, its next task was to decide
which level of scrutiny to apply to the governmental classification. In
determining whether a statute passes constitutional muster under the
Equal Protection Clause, the decision regarding which level of
scrutiny to apply is paramount. Indeed, the level of scrutiny guides
the Court’s analysis and determines not only how narrowly tailored to
a state interest the challenged measure must be, but also how
important the state interest must be in enacting the legislation.
The Plyler Court found that strict scrutiny was inappropriate for
two reasons. First, in the Court’s view, undocumented noncitizens
80

Id.
118 U.S. 356 (1866).
82
Id. at 369.
83
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 212 n.10.
84
Id. at 210.
85
Id. at 214 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866) (remarks of
Rep. Bingham)).
81
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are not a suspect class because their unlawful presence in the country
in violation of federal law is not, in the Court’s words, a
86
“constitutional irrelevancy.”
The second reason why the Court
rejected strict scrutiny was the existing precedent that education is
not a fundamental right that would require a narrow tailoring of the
87
legislation and a compelling state interest to justify its curtailment.
Thus, the Plyler Court reaffirmed the holding in San Antonio
88
Independent School District v. Rodriguez —that education is not a
89
fundamental right—despite Justice Marshall’s plea to overrule it.
It is clear that Justice Brennan, who dissented in Rodriguez yet
wrote the majority opinion in Plyler, did not have the votes to overrule
90
Rodriguez via Plyler and hold that education is a fundamental right.
In his Rodriguez dissent, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority’s
view that the only rights that may be deemed fundamental are those
explicitly and implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution and instead
stated that “‘fundamentality’ is . . . a function of the right’s
importance in terms of the effectuation of those rights which are
91
constitutionally guaranteed.”
In fact, in his Rodriguez dissent, Justice Brennan used the
following language from Justice Marshall’s dissent in the same case:
“‘As the nexus between the specific constitutional guarantee and the
nonconstitutional interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional interest
becomes more fundamental and the degree of judicial scrutiny
applied when the interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis must
86

Id. at 223.
Id. (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28–39 (1973)
(holding that education is not a fundamental right and that “a State need not justify
by compelling necessity every variation in the manner in which education is provided
to its population”)).
88
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
89
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230–31. Article 28 of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child states that “Parties recognize the right of the child to an education.”
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 28, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1467,
available at Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2005). Subsection
(a) of that article requires Parties to the Convention “make primary education
compulsory and available free to all.” Id. art. 28(a), 28 I.L.M. at 1467; see also Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Dec. 7, 2000, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (C
364) 1, available at University of Minnesota Human Rights Library,
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/europeancharter2.html
(stating
that
everyone has a right to education including the possibility of receiving a free
compulsory education) (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
90
See generally Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism,
93 MICH. L. REV. 1854, 1862–74 (1995) (discussing the deliberations that took place
during the drafting of the Plyler decision).
91
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87
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be adjusted accordingly.’”
As discussed below, Justice Brennan’s
majority opinion in Plyler, a little more than a decade later, reflected
this view. Indeed, the Plyler Court applied what, in effect, amounts to
a heightened, almost intermediate level of scrutiny, rather than a
93
traditional rational basis standard.
Yet, the application of this heightened level of scrutiny to the
denial of an education to undocumented children would not have
been Justice Brennan’s predictable position based on his previous
statement in the Rodriguez dissent. There, the Justice asserted that
education is “inextricably linked to the right to participate in the
electoral process and to the rights of free speech and association
94
guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Based on the close nexus
between the constitutional guarantees of the First Amendment and
the non-fundamental right to an education, Justice Brennan opined
in his Rodriguez dissent that “any classification affecting education
95
must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.” This turned out not to
be the case in Plyler, however, where Justice Brennan did not find
education to be a fundamental right and thus did not apply strict
scrutiny to a state law denying education to undocumented children.
After the Court rejected the strict scrutiny standard in Plyler, it
continued its equal protection analysis by applying a rational basis
test to a Texas law that deprived undocumented children of a public
education. Yet, though the Court purported to apply the traditional
rational basis test, a close reading of the opinion reveals that the
96
Court actually employed a more demanding standard.
Application of a heightened rational basis test in Plyler began
with the recognition that education is “‘perhaps the most important
97
function of state and local governments.’” The Court then found
that the state’s decision to deny an education to undocumented

92

Id. at 62–63 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 102–03
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
93
See infra notes 96–104 and accompanying text.
94
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96
This application of heightened scrutiny under the rational basis standard of
review seems stronger than traditional rational basis because under traditional
rational basis the classification only needs to be rationally related to a legitimate
government interest. See Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the
Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 382
(1999); see also Rachel F. Moran, Demography and Distrust: The Latino Challenge to Civil
Rights and Immigration Policy in the 1990s and Beyond, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 1, 14 (1995)
(discussing Supreme Court’s application of “rationality with a bite” standard).
97
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954)).
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students could hardly be considered rational unless it furthered some
98
substantial state goal. In assessing the rationality of the state statute,
the Court warned that the cost to the nation and to the innocent
99
children involved must be taken into account. The Court further
stated that “it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected
100
to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education”
and noted that because the state took it upon itself to provide an
education to children, it had to be made “available to all on equal
101
terms.”
The fact that it would be unfair to penalize the undocumented
students for their parents’ illicit act was another concern for the
102
Court.
The Court found that undocumented children “can affect
103
Because the
neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status.”
Texas law was directed towards children and imposed its
discriminatory burden on the basis of a characteristic for which the
children had no control, the Court found that there could not be a
rational justification for penalizing the children for their presence in
104
the country.
Furthermore, the Court was concerned about the creation of a
permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, which, in its view,
105
could result because of their lack of education.
The Court stated
that “[l]egislation imposing special disabilities upon groups
disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests
the kind of ‘class or caste’ treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment
106
was designed to abolish.”
The Court recognized that depriving
undocumented children of an education could result in the creation
of a caste by imposing “a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of
107
children not accountable for their disabling status.”
The Supreme Court expressed further concerns about the
existence of this so-called “shadow population”—an undocumented
underclass—allowed to remain in the United States by lax
immigration enforcement and as a cheap labor source that need not
be granted any of the benefits afforded to citizens or legally admitted
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Id. at 224.
Id.
Id. at 223 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
Id. (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
Id. at 220.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770 (1977)).
See id.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 218 n.14.
Id. at 223.
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108

noncitizens.
In the Court’s view, the existence of this
undocumented underclass “presents most difficult problems for a
Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under
109
the law.”
The Court next addressed the state’s argument that the goal of
reducing state expenditures by denying a free public education to the
children of the undocumented was a legitimate one. The Court
responded that there was no “evidence in the record suggesting that
illegal entrants impose any significant burden on the State’s
110
111
economy.” In fact, the district court had noted in Doe v. Plyler that
“families of undocumented children contribute no less to the
financing of local education than do citizens or legal residents of
112
similar means.”
Additionally, the state’s singling out of undocumented children
for denial of a free public education because “their unlawful
presence within the United States renders them less likely than other
children to remain within the boundaries of the State, and to put
their education to productive social or political use within the State,”
113
was similarly unpersuasive to the Court.
Even though
undocumented children would be subject to deportation, the Court
found that many of them would remain in the country indefinitely,
and some would even become lawful residents or United States
114
citizens.
Finally, the Court concluded that “if the State is to deny a
discrete group of innocent children the free public education that it
offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial must
be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state
115
interest.” This formulation, of course, is a higher form of scrutiny
116
than the traditional rational basis test, as discussed above.
Ultimately, because the state made no showing of a substantial state
interest, the Court invalidated the Texas law.
Thus, the Plyler Court contextualized the inequality inherent in
the state’s denial of an education to undocumented children. The
108

Id. at 219.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218–19.
110
Id. at 228.
111
458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
112
Elizabeth Hull, Undocumented Aliens and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis
of Doe v. Plyler, 48 BROOK. L. REV. 43, 59 (1981); see also Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 588–89.
113
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229–30.
114
Id. at 230.
115
Id.
116
See supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text.
109
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Court’s equal protection analysis resulted in its use of a rational basis
level of scrutiny in theory, but not in practice. Notwithstanding this
contextualization and the Court’s sweeping language regarding the
existence of an undocumented underclass, undocumented students
have not been afforded rights without resistance, as discussed
117
below.
B. Three Concurrences: Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell
Three members of the Court wrote concurrences in Plyler:
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell.
Justice Marshall’s
concurrence reaffirmed his view that “an individual’s interest in
118
education is fundamental” and rejected the rigid two-tier approach
in equal protection jurisprudence, calling instead for varying levels of
scrutiny “depending upon the ‘constitutional and societal importance
of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of
119
the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.’”
Both
assertions were reiterations of views that Justice Marshall had
120
expressed in earlier dissents.
But as discussed earlier, the Plyler
majority tacitly employed a “sliding scale” approach to the standard
121
of constitutional review in its equal protection analysis.
Justice Blackmun’s concurrence emphasized his view that “the
nature of the interest at stake is crucial to the proper resolution” of
the case and reaffirmed that, when analyzing whether a fundamental
right exists for equal protection purposes, there are meaningful
distinctions among the multitude of social and political interests
122
regulated by the states.
In Justice Blackmun’s view, “denial of an
education is the analogue of denial of the right to vote: the former
relegates the individual to second-class social status; the latter places
123
him at a permanent political disadvantage.”
The Justice also
enunciated his conviction that the classification of undocumented
children was not a “monolithic” one and that many of the students
124
would remain in this country permanently.
Finally, Justice Powell wrote separately “to emphasize the unique

117

See infra Parts IV & V.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (Marshall, J., concurring).
119
Id. at 231 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99
(1973)).
120
Id.
121
See supra note 96 and text accompanying notes 115–16.
122
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 231 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
123
Id. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
124
Id. at 236 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
118
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125

character” of the case.
In Powell’s view, the undocumented
children were being severely disadvantaged by factors such as the
federal government’s inability to control the border and the
attractiveness of jobs in the United States, and he agreed that they
126
were victims who should not be left on the streets uneducated.
Justice Powell also opined that excluding the undocumented
children “from a state-provided education is a type of punitive
discrimination based on status that is impermissible under the Equal
127
Protection Clause.”
It should be noted that Justice Powell played a key role in the
evolution of the majority decision in Plyler. In addition to drafting his
concurrence, Justice Powell engaged in several written exchanges
with Justice Brennan and requested that Justice Brennan share with
128
him several versions of the draft opinion.
Thus, it has been said
that the ultimate result in Plyler became “almost nothing more than a
129
direct reflection of [Powell’s] views of social policy.”
In other
words, because the Justice found the Texas statute problematic and
misguided as a matter of social policy, he regarded it as
130
unconstitutional.
In fact, another effect of Justice Powell’s role in
the evolution of the majority opinion is the dilution of the doctrinal
arguments in the previous drafts, leaving it with “almost no
generative or doctrinal significance because it invoked too many
131
considerations.”
This, of course, is one of the areas in which the
dissent strongly criticized the majority opinion, as will be explored in
Part II.C.
C. Dissent: The Beginning of the Attack on Plyler?
The 5–4 decision in Plyler reveals a deeply divided court. Chief
Justice Burger’s dissent pointed out that the majority cobbled
together a custom-made standard of review by “patching together bits
and pieces of what might be termed a quasi-suspect class and quasifundamental rights analysis, [and] . . . spin[ning] out a theory
132
custom-tailored to the facts of these cases.”
Justice Burger stated
125

Id. at 236 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. at 237–38 (Powell, J., concurring).
127
Id. at 240 (Powell, J., concurring).
128
Tushnet, supra note 90, at 1866–73.
129
Id. at 1873.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Plyler opinion was
criticized at the time as “appear[ing] to be ad hoc and divorced from other related
bodies of law created by the Court.” Phillip B. Kurland & Dennis J. Hutchinson, The
126
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that if “ever a court was guilty of an unabashedly result-oriented
133
The dissent
approach, this case [would be] a prime example.”
further averred that, unpalatable though it may have seemed, the
choice to enact legislation was a political one, and not a function of
134
the Court. In Chief Justice Burger’s view, it is up to Congress, not
to the Court, to “assess the social costs borne by our Nation when
select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills
135
upon which our social order rests.”
The dissent did not dispute that the denial of an education to
this group of children would create a permanent caste of noncitizens.
In fact the specter of this permanent caste was a “disturbing one;” yet
it was Chief Justice Burger’s contention that this was “one segment of
136
a larger problem” for the “political branches to solve.”
Justice
Burger further argued that the majority in Plyler “seeks to do
137
Congress’ job for it,” and that it failed to allow the political process
138
to run its course.
As with any deeply divided opinion of the Supreme Court, it is
likely that such a vigorous dissent may have contributed to Plyler’s
139
vulnerability to attack from both federal and state quarters. Also, in
a sense, Chief Justice Burger’s words are prophetic in that the only
recourse for undocumented children who have received an
education and want to further pursue the American dream still lies in
the political process. Only by means of that process may the
undocumented embark upon a path to legalization, and the ability to
work legally and attend postsecondary educational institutions free of
140
the obstacles they face today.
III. SUBSEQUENT HISTORY OF PLYLER: UNDOCUMENTED TODAY,
DOCUMENTED TOMORROW?
The named plaintiffs in Plyler, which was a class action lawsuit,
were sixteen Mexican children who could not establish that they had
Business of the Supreme Court, O.T. 1982, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 628, 650 (1983). Prof.
Dennis J. Hutchinson has further asserted that “Plyler cut a remarkably messy path
through other areas of the Court’s jurisprudence.” Dennis J. Hutchinson, More
Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 167, 184.
133
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
134
Id. at 253–54.
135
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
136
Id. at 254.
137
Id.
138
Id. This argument, of course, could be considered by some a convenient and
politically expedient solution.
139
See infra Part IV.
140
See infra Part V.B.
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been legally admitted into the United States. The State argued that
these children should be singled out because they were less likely to
remain within the State and put their education to “productive social
142
or political use within the State.” As noted, the Court dismissed this
143
argument, asserting that no State has such a guarantee. The Court
noted that “many of the undocumented children . . . will remain in
this country indefinitely, and that some will become lawful residents
144
or citizens.”
According to available data, this prediction proved
true not only for the vast majority of the Plyler plaintiffs, but for
145
noncitizens in general.
The available citizenship data show that, of the noncitizens that
arrived in the United States before 1970, 80.5% obtained citizenship
146
by 2002.
Furthermore, of those who entered the country between
1970 and 1979, 66.6% had obtained citizenship by 2002 and 45% who
147
entered between 1980 and 1989 had obtained citizenship. Finally,
of those who entered in 1990 or later, 12.7% had obtained
148
citizenship.
What about the Plyler plaintiffs?
What has been their
experience? More than a decade after the opinion was issued,
thirteen of the sixteen children were interviewed by journalists for a
leading national newspaper. The interviews disclosed that ten of
149
them finished high school in Tyler, Texas. All of those interviewed
are now legal residents and most of them have full-time
150
employment. Although many have taken college courses, none has
151
graduated from a four-year institution.
They work as teacher’s
aides, automobile mechanics, assembly-line workers, managers,
152
painters, and stock clerks. Some work in the very school district that
141

See Plyler, 458 F. Supp. at 571 & n.1 (“Prior to the trial of this case on the
merits, the court ordered that the action be maintained as a class action on behalf of
all undocumented school-aged children of Mexican origin residing within the
boundaries of the Tyler Independent School District.”).
142
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229–30.
143
Id. at 230; see supra text accompanying notes 113–14.
144
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230.
145
See Paul Feldman, Texas Case Looms Over Prop. 187’s Legal Future, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 1994, at A1; Dianne Schmidley, The Foreign-Born Population in the United
States:
March 2002 (Feb. 2003), available at U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-539.pdf (Feb. 2003).
146
Schmidley, supra note 145.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Feldman, supra note 145, at A1.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
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tried to bar them, and three are full-time housewives. Of the four
families which these sixteen children comprised, only one has moved
154
out of Tyler.
Indeed, they appear to have attained the American
dream by moving from undocumented to documented members of
United States society.
The experience of the Plyler plaintiffs reflects the view of
Professors Aleinikoff and Rumbaut, who have cited studies showing
that, despite the fears of a multicultural nation underlying this
“immigration crisis,” noncitizen acculturation within United States
155
society is continuing its progress, as it has in the past.
Thus, the
available evidence to date show that the State’s argument in Plyler that
the undocumented children would not put their education to use to
benefit the state of Texas has proven to be false. This evidence
comports with the economists’ view of the social benefits of an
education, which recognizes that education has a value to society
156
beyond its value to the individual student.
Among these social benefits are “a more-educated and betterinformed electorate, lower rates of crime and violence, lower rates of
poverty, better health and nutrition, and, generally a more smoothly
157
functioning society.”
These social benefits ensue regardless of
immigration status because the undocumented person of today could
indeed become the permanent resident or citizen of tomorrow.
IV. PLYLER UNDER ATTACK
As time has passed and Plyler has endured as precedent, it has
not been immune from attack; there have been legislative efforts to
overrule the decision. In fact, the right to K–12 education for
undocumented students has been under siege both at the federal and
state levels as part of the current culture war against illegal
immigration.
A. Federal Proposals
There were two federal proposals—in 1995 and 1996—that
158
would have effectively overruled Plyler.
These essentially identical
153

Id.
Id.
155
T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Ruben G. Rumbaut, Terms of Belonging: Are Models of
Membership Self-Fulfilling Prophecies?, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 10 (1998).
156
Rebecca A. Maynard & Daniel J. McGrath, Family Structure, Fertility, and Child
Welfare, in THE SOCIAL BENEFITS OF EDUCATION 125 (Jere R. Behrman & Nevzer Stacey
eds., 1997).
157
Id.
158
H.R. 4134, 104th Cong. (1996); H.R. 1377, 104th Cong. (1995); see also Nat’l
154
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proposals came at the time of the passage of the Illegal Immigration
159
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”). The Gallegly
amendments to the IIRIRA, sponsored by California’s Congressman
Elton Gallegly, would have authorized “[s]tates to deny public
education benefits to certain aliens not lawfully present in the United
160
States.” The Gallegly amendments reflected the view that allowing
undocumented students the opportunity to receive an education
161
imposed
“promote[ed] violations of the immigration laws,”
“significant burden[s] on States’ economies and deplete[ed] states’
162
limited educational resources.”
The proposed amendments also
expressly permitted states to charge tuition fees to undocumented
163
children.
This, of course, was prohibited by Plyler as a denial of
164
equal protection. The Gallegly amendments were not included in
165
Opposition by Texas senators Kay Bailey
the final legislation.
Hutchison and Phil Gramm as well as an organized publicity
campaign by a number of public interest groups contributed to the
166
amendments’ defeat.
B. State Proposals: California’s Proposition 187
In California, following a very fractious and divisive campaign in
which its proponents chanted “Save our State,” Proposition 187
167
passed by a close vote on November 8, 1994.
Once the ballot
168
One of its key
initiative passed, it became effective the next day.
provisions, Section 7, contravened the mandate of Plyler in that it
Ass’n for College Admission Counseling, Issue Focus: Considering Undocumented
Students in American Schools, NACAC BULL., Feb. 2001, at 1, 7, available at
http://www.nacac.com/fe2001.pdf [hereinafter Undocumented Students].
159
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of U.S.C.).
160
H.R. 4134.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
165
Undocumented Students, supra note 158, at 7.
166
Sidney Weintraub et al., Responses to Migration Issues, in U.S. COMM’N ON
IMMIGRATION REFORM, MEXICO–U.S. BINATIONAL MIGRATION STUDY REPORT 437, 468
(1997), available at http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/binpapers/v1-5weintraub.pdf
(last updated Apr. 20, 1998); see also Butler, supra note 76, at 1485 (noting that a
bipartisan effort united to have Gallegly amendments defeated).
167
League of United Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 763 (C.D. Cal.
1995) [hereinafter LULAC]. For an excellent in-depth discussion of Proposition 187,
its main provisions and their constitutionality, see Lolita K. Buckner Inniss,
California’s Proposition 187—Does It Mean What It Says? Does It Say What It Means? A
Textual and Constitutional Analysis, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 577 (1996).
168
LULAC, 908 F. Supp. at 763.
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denied undocumented children in the state a free public school
169
This provision was judicially invalidated in League of
education.
170
United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson (“LULAC”).
The LULAC litigation was decided in two opinions. Both the
1995 and 1997 decisions explicitly reaffirmed Plyler. In 1995, a
district court in the Central District of California held that Section 7,
which required the exclusion of undocumented students from public
171
schools, was preempted by federal law under the Supremacy Clause,
172
based on the Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis in Plyler. In
addition, in 1997, the court again followed Plyler, and noted also that
Section 1643 of the California law expressly deferred to Plyler in
providing that “[n]othing in this chapter may be construed as
addressing alien eligibility for a basic public education as determined
173
by the Supreme Court of the United States under Plyler v. Doe.”
At the time of Proposition 187’s introduction and passage,
opinions as to whether the Court would overrule or affirm Plyler via
the LULAC litigation varied, but most commentators believed that
LULAC would reach the Supreme Court and result in an overruling
174
of Plyler.
LULAC was not brought before the Supreme Court,
however, and the parties dropped their appeals following an
agreement to enter into dispute resolution regarding the issues raised
175
in the appeal.
Although the federal proposal overruling Plyler did not pass and
California’s Proposition 187 was invalidated in a judicial
reaffirmation of Plyler, both of these instances serve as hallmarks of
the culture wars surrounding the education of Latino undocumented
169

Id. at 774.
997 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997); 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
171
LULAC, 908 F. Supp. at 774.
172
Id.
173
LULAC, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1255 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citation omitted).
174
See, e.g., Phillip Cooper, Plyler at the Core: Understanding the Proposition 187
Challenge, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 64, 64–65 (1995) (stating that though
Proposition 187 challenged the Supreme Court to overturn Plyler, the decision
should survive); Benjamin N. Bedrick, Note, The Equal Protection Clause—State
Statutory Restrictions on the Education of Illegal Alien Children—Proposition 187, 14 DICK. J.
INT’L. L. 403 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court should rely on Plyler to
invalidate section 7); Corinna Barrett Lain, Note, Outraged over Immigration:
Rethinking Doctrinal Responses, 82 VA. L. REV. 987, 1009 (1996) (contending that the
Supreme Court should overrule Plyler and uphold section 7); John T. Ritondo, Jr.,
Comment, California’s Duty to Educate the World: Proposition 187 and Mere Rationality,
26 CUMB. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1995-1996) (arguing that Plyler should be overruled).
175
Janice Alfred, Note, Denial of the American Dream: The Plight of Undocumented
High School Students Within the U.S. Educational System, 19 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 615,
626 & n.62 (2003).
170
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children. What these attacks on Plyler reveal is a deep-seeded
resentment towards undocumented immigrants, mostly due to the
high cost that states bear when educating their children. This was an
argument, however, that the Court rejected in Plyler as an
insufficiently rational basis for denying educational opportunities to
176
undocumented children.
V. PLYLER’S CHALLENGE TO BRING ABOUT BROADER CHANGE FOR
UNDOCUMENTED STUDENTS
Much like Brown v. Board of Education, Plyler called for
unprecedented reforms addressing the needs of marginalized youth
and imposed duties on the states regarding their education.
Although Plyler has certainly opened many doors for individual
177
undocumented schoolchildren, it has not had the intense effect
upon educational systems that Brown has had over the years. In fact,
it may be that Plyler acts as a form of preserving the undocumented as
a separate class, ensuring a primary and secondary education for
their children, but nothing more within society. Does this mean that
Plyler would not withstand attack if the issue of the education of the
undocumented were to come before the Supreme Court again? As
discussed below, the Court’s latest pronouncements of equal
protection in education suggest otherwise.
A. Equal Protection: Context Matters
In the area of equal protection and education, we have seen the
evolution from the school desegregation mandated in Brown, to
affirmative action in higher education as a race-conscious remedy. In
178
179
two companion cases, Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, the
Supreme Court recently ruled that colleges may consider race as part
180
of a narrowly tailored, race-conscious admissions plan.
A raceconscious admissions program that does not “‘unduly burden
individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic
181
groups’” satisfies the narrow-tailoring requirement.
Quotas or the
176
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229. A recent legislative proposal in Arizona would require
school officials to verify the immigration status of parents of students before allowing
them to enroll their children, in direct contravention of Plyler. See Associated Press,
Arizona to Clamp Down Even Harder on Illegals, March 4, 2005, available at
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2005/3/4/112027.shtml.
177
See supra Part III.
178
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
179
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
180
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
181
Id. at 341 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990)
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automatic award of points based on race, however, are
182
In the Court’s view, because the Fourteenth
impermissible.
Amendment protects persons, not groups, classifications based on
race are “‘in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore
183
prohibited.’”
The Court found that close judicial scrutiny is
required to “‘ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the
184
laws has not been infringed.’”
In Grutter, the Supreme Court recognized that “context matters”
185
in an equal protection analysis.
In the Court’s view, strict scrutiny
provides a structure in which to examine the “importance and the
186
sincerity of the reasons” set forth for the classification within each
187
context. In this contextualization of equal protection doctrine, the
Court has departed from its decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
188
Pena.
There, the Court did not give weight to the social context
behind the benign racial classification aimed at remedying past
discrimination, a sentiment echoed by Justice Scalia, who stated that
189
“[i]n the eyes of government, we are just one race here.”
The opinions in Gratz and Grutter establish that any policy that
treats one racial group differently than another must employ
narrowly tailored measures that further a compelling governmental
190
interest.
The Court has indicated that a narrowly tailored policy
will survive strict scrutiny, thereby leaving open the idea that if a state
can show a compelling governmental interest in denying education
to undocumented children, and the means of denial is narrowly
tailored, it would be upheld under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
It is noteworthy, however, that the
Supreme Court clarified that only an “‘exact connection between
justification and classification’” will support the use of racial
191
classifications.
Plyler gives us a clue as to what a compelling
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
182
See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (holding that automatic distribution of “20 points, or
one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission,” virtually guaranteed
admission to the underrepresented minority and in effect made race a deciding
factor rather than merely a plus factor).
183
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
184
Id. (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227) (emphasis in original quoted source).
185
Id. at 327.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
189
Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
190
See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
191
See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537
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governmental interest might be in the area of education. In holding
that the school district’s policy was unconstitutional, the Court found
that the district had failed to show that educating undocumented
children imposed a substantial burden on the state, referring to
almost negligible costs associated with the education of those
children.
Today, however, there are approximately 1.6 million
192
undocumented students in the United States,
and the once
193
Yet, the context of
negligible costs are now in the billions.
inequality and the existence of an underclass of undocumented
individuals still survives. Presumably, that would be taken into
account before the Court would consider overruling Plyler.
B. Access to Higher Education for Undocumented Students: Mixed
Success
Another area in which Plyler has faced challenges in creating
educational opportunity is in postsecondary education for the
undocumented. Access to higher education is still an unattainable
reality for undocumented students. For undocumented students, the
obstacles to access to higher education range from the denial of
194
195
admission, to an inability to obtain student loans, to being
196
all because of lack of legal
charged nonresident tuition,
immigration status. The following two sections will detail the efforts
being undertaken at the state and federal levels to ensure access to
postsecondary education for undocumented Latino students in the
United States.
1.

Federal Efforts: Work in Progress

At the federal level, there have been several proposals to allow
197
undocumented students access to higher education. Most notably,
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
192
See supra note 31.
193
Though there are no overall figures, a few states have begun to estimate the
costs of educating undocumented students. Pennsylvania estimates its cost to be
between $50 million and $87.5 million, while Texas estimates its cost to be as high as
$1.04 billion. See GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 13.
194
Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Va. 2004).
195
See 8 U.S.C. § 1611 (2000). See, e.g., Margaret Fosmoe, Undocumented Teen
Dreams of College Despite Obstacles: Youth Looks Beyond His Lack of Documents in Planning
Future, S. BEND TRIB., Apr. 26, 2004, at A2 (recounting the story of Carlos, an Indiana
high-school student who hopes to go to college but is ineligible for Federal or State
aid because of his undocumented status).
196
8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2000).
197
See Earned Legalization and Family Unification Act of 2003, H.R. 1830, 108th
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the DREAM Act would amend the IIRIRA and repeal 8 U.S.C. § 1623,
which denies education benefits to undocumented students if a
United States national would not be eligible for the same benefits,
198
without regard to State residence.
Also, under certain
circumstances, the DREAM Act would allow adjustment to legal status
199
for undocumented students who complete a college education.
Section 4 of the DREAM Act provides for the cancellation of the
removal of an undocumented student who has been admitted to an
institution of higher education or who has earned his or her high
200
school diploma or GED. Under this provision, the student’s status
would be adjusted to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
201
residence.
The Student Adjustment Act of 2003 is the House
companion bill to the Senate’s DREAM Act and also would permit
states to determine residency requirements for higher education
202
purposes.
The House version also contains provisions for the
203
adjustment of an undocumented student’s illegal status. Both bills
were left pending at the end of the 108th Congress and are expected
to be reintroduced in 2005.
The Supreme Court’s rationale in Plyler regarding the
unfairness of penalizing undocumented children for their parents’
204
illegal acts, as well as the concern over the creation of a permanent
205
caste of undocumented residents, would seem to be applicable to
the undocumented student seeking access to higher education in this
day and age. Commentators have similarly suggested that public
policy supports the desirability of federal activity in furtherance of
providing higher education opportunities for undocumented
206
students.

Cong. (2003); Worker Amnesty and Opportunity Act of 2003, H.R. 604, 108th Cong.
(2003); Preserving Educational Opportunities for Immigrant Children Act of 2003,
H.R. 84, 108th Cong. (2003); Educational Excellence for All Learners Act of 2003, S.
8, 108th Cong. (2003); Earned Legalization and Family Unification Act of 2002, H.R.
3271, 107th Cong. (2002).
198
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2003, S. 1545,
108th Cong. § 3 (2003).
199
Id. § 5(d)(1)(D).
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
H.R. 1684, 108th Cong. (2003).
203
Id.
204
See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
205
See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text.
206
See Alfred, supra note 175, at 618.
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State Efforts: Activity in the Majority of the States

Across the country, there has been action at the state level to
allow access to higher education for undocumented students. A
recent examination of the laws of the fifty states on this topic
discloses the following results. Eight states—California, Illinois,
Kansas, New York, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Washington—permit
207
undocumented students to pay resident tuition rates. These states
grant in-state tuition based not on residency but on the basis of
208
graduation from a high school in that state. Twenty-one additional
states have considered legislation allowing undocumented students to
pay in-state tuition rates. Most of these bills, however, never even
209
made it to a vote or were postponed indefinitely in committees.
The remaining twenty-one states have not considered the issue at
210
all.
Undocumented students seeking a higher education, however,
have been dealt severe blows in recent litigation in two states. In the
first case, several undocumented students sued Virginia higher
211
education institutions for failure to admit them under a state policy.
212
the plaintiffs, several
In Equal Access Education v. Merten,
undocumented students and one association, claimed that federal
207

See Jessica Salsbury, Comment, Evading Residence: Undocumented Students, Higher
Education, and the States, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 459, 473–75 (2003). See, for example, CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (West 2005) which exempts undocumented students from
paying nonresident tuition rates if they have attended high school in California for
three or more years and have graduated from a California high school or received
the equivalency thereof. See also TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 54.052(j) (Vernon 2004),
which classifies an undocumented student as a resident if the student resides with his
or her parent or guardian for three or more years while attending high school in the
state and has graduated from a Texas high school or received the equivalency of a
high-school diploma.
208
There are two types of laws granting undocumented students in-state tuition.
One grants them in-state tuition by exempting them from paying nonresident tuition
while the other type classifies an undocumented student as a resident. See the
California and Texas examples, supra note 207. See also Victor Romero, Postsecondary
School Education Benefits for Undocumented Immigrants: Promises and Pitfalls, 27 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 393, 404–07 (2002); Salsbury, supra note 207, at 473.
209
The states that have considered legislation are: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., H.B. 2518, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 2003); S.B. 1367, 92nd Gen. Assem. (Mo. 2004).
210
States that have not even considered the issue are Alabama, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, New
Hampshire, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
211
Equal Access Education v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 585 (E.D. Va. 2004).
212
305 F. Supp. 2d 585 (E.D. Va. 2004).
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immigration law preempted the denial of admission to Virginia
institutions of higher education, and that such denial violated the
213
Commerce and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution.
The
plaintiffs have found themselves on the losing side of all of the
rulings in the case. For instance, unlike Plyler, where the plaintiffs
proceeded anonymously, the five undocumented students in Equal
214
Access Education were not allowed to proceed anonymously.
As a
result, three of the individual plaintiffs were unable to continue in
215
that role for fear of being deported. The next setback was a pretrial
216
Finally, the
dismissal of a large part of the plaintiffs’ case.
undocumented students lost the case altogether when the remaining
aspects of the case were dismissed after the court found that the
universities were using the appropriate federal standards to identify
217
the undocumented students.
Thus, as Equal Access Education
illustrates, the rights of the undocumented students in the higher
education context have been left unprotected in what would appear
to be the beginning of an erosion of Plyler’s promise of educational
218
equality.
More recently, a lawsuit has been filed on behalf of two dozen
United States citizen students, or parents of students, who pay non219
resident tuition at Kansas universities.
They are challenging the
220
that offers in-state tuition to
recently enacted Kansas law
undocumented students who have graduated from and attended high
school in Kansas for at least three years or have obtained their GED
221
in Kansas.
The plaintiffs in the case allege that the Kansas law, H.B. 2145,
violates § 505 of IIRIRA, which prohibits an illegal alien from
222
receiving a benefit for which a United States citizen is ineligible.
Plaintiffs also assert that H.B. 2145 contravenes federal law in that it
213

Id. at 585.
See Doe v. Merten, 219 F.R.D. 387 (E.D. Va. 2004).
215
See Equal Access Educ., 305 F. Supp. 2d at 592 n.3.
216
Id. at 614.
217
Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 325 F. Supp. 2d 655 (E.D. Va. 2004); see also
Kendra Nichols, Federal Judge Dismisses Illegal Immigrants’ Lawsuit Against Virginia’s
Public Colleges, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 6, 2004, at A24.
218
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 202.
219
Day v. Sebelius, No. 04-4085 (D. Kan. filed July 19, 2004); see also Sara Hebel,
Opponents of Lower Tuition for Illegal Immigrants Seek to Strike Down Kansas Law, CHRON.
DAILY REP. (Chronicle of Higher Educ., Wash., D.C.), July 21, 2004, at
http://chronicle.com/daily/2004/07/2004072103n.htm (copy on file with author).
220
H.B. 2145, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2004).
221
See Hebel, supra note 219.
222
Id.
214

1404

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 35:1373

creates distinct immigration classifications only operative in Kansas
that are not based on federal standards used to determine who is a
223
lawful resident in the United States.
Plaintiffs also allege that
implementation of H.B. 2145 will encourage and induce the
“transport of aliens into and across the United States” in violation of
224
federal immigration law.
Finally, the plaintiffs allege that a law
drawing a distinction on the basis of alienage must meet the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause under the heightened
standard of review, and that, because these students will not be able
to work once they are educated, the arguments regarding their
225
This case is still
contribution to the workforce are unpersuasive.
pending. If the court does not contextualize the equal protection
claim and instead follows the Adarand model, there is a possibility
that the plaintiffs will succeed.
CONCLUSION: THE CONTINUED VITALITY OF PLYLER
It is my contention that the importance of the Plyler debate to
the education of undocumented Latino children turns on whether,
once educational achievements are obtained, the undocumented will
be able to become productive members of United States society, an
226
aim the Supreme Court embraced in Plyler.
As Professor Victor
Romero stated:
[W]ithout a guarantee that an undocumented person can achieve
lawful immigration status following graduation from college, such
a person will always live under the double threat of being
ineligible to lawfully hold a job and possible removal from the
United States. And, since immigration regulation is a federal
power, state legislatures could not tie academic achievement or
state residency to immigration status. The power to change one’s
227
immigration status rests solely on Congress’s shoulders.

In my view, the continued vitality of Plyler lies in the renewed call
for immigration reform, so that once the undocumented student is
educated in our country, he or she will have the opportunity to work
legally in the United States. The spirit and message of Plyler would
have the undocumented student achieve a measure of educational
parity, as education is the great equalizer. To this extent, the
undocumented may appear to have entered into the confines of
223
224
225
226
227

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
See Romero, supra note 208, at 406–07 (footnotes omitted).
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“post-national” citizenship, if not formal citizenship.
Post-national
citizenship could serve as a way in which the undocumented may
assert their claims by virtue of their personhood, based on universal
229
human rights, education being one of the basic human rights. Yet,
the very endurance of Plyler as precedent may itself then perpetuate
230
231
the “silent covenant”
of the “shadow population”
of the
undocumented, who have the right to at least a secondary (highschool) education, but are unable to work and become full members
of our society, and thus are unable to achieve a sense of belonging in
this country. Because the nation’s interest in maintaining a cheap
232
and expendable labor force has converged with the expectation of
an education for undocumented children, Plyler survives to this day.
That Plyler can be viewed as an interest convergence case is
further evinced by the fact that it was decided at a time when the
hiring of undocumented workers had not yet been outlawed by the
233
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), and thus, it still was
considered to serve the nation’s interest to have undocumented
workers and their families in the country. I contend that providing
the children of undocumented workers a free public education
would still be to the nation’s benefit, as in fact Justice Powell noted
when he stated that education may be one of the reasons for the
234
undocumented to come to the United States.
Viewing Plyler v. Doe in this light, and assessing the current
situation of undocumented students in the United States, it is
apparent that their educational advancement will occur when there is
a convergence between the nation’s interest in allowing the
normalization of their immigration status and the nation’s need for
228
See Peter Schuck, The Re-Evaluation of American Citizenship, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
1, 30 (1997) (describing “post-national citizenship” as a consruct of the concept of
citizenship based not on national identity but on “universal personhood”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
229
Id.
230
Professor Derrick Bell has identified silent covenants with respect to social
reform, in particular with respect to school desegregation. In his view, “to settle
potentially costly differences between two opposing groups of whites, a compromise
is effected that depends on the involuntary sacrifice of black rights or interests.”
BELL, supra note 21, at 29. In the case of undocumented students, their sacrifice of
the potential for a better life can be seen as the compromise for the existence and
endurance of Plyler.
231
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218.
232
For a thorough analysis of the interest convergence theory with respect to
Brown v. Board of Education, see BELL, supra note 21, at 59.
233
Immigration Reform and Control Act, § 274A, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359, 3360–74 (1986) (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a (West 1999 & Supp. 2004)).
234
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 237 (Powell, J., concurring).
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the work that the undocumented perform. “After almost two decades
of anti-immigrant legislation, President Bush has finally announced a
proposal to allow temporary guestworker status to undocumented
235
workers under certain conditions.
If the guestworker proposal
announced by the President is any indication, it may be that such
interests are about to converge.

235

See Press Release, President Bush Proposes New Temporary Worker Program,
supra note 76.

